Between Dependency and Diversification: Agrarian Reform in Colombia and the Shift in International Cooperation

Since 2023, Colombia and China have announced bilateral agreements in which China committed to providing commercial support for agrarian reform. Colombia’s accession to the Belt and Road Initiative in 2025 reinforced this trend: in May 2026, Minister Martha Carvajalino presented the acceleration of health clearance for Colombian agricultural products as a form of cooperation that contributes to territorial peace, rural development, and the replacement of illicit economies. This opening of the Chinese market comes as U.S. funding is declining and tariffs on Colombian agricultural products are once again being discussed. This contrast led us to investigate how international cooperation is changing and what that change means for agrarian reform.

–        The void left by U.S. funding cuts

 Cuts to international funding driven by the Donald Trump administration have raised concerns in Colombia, particularly in rural regions affected by the armed conflict, such as Chocó and Catatumbo, where social organizations and institutional actors warn that a potential reduction in funding could weaken humanitarian programs, peacebuilding initiatives, and support for peasant, Indigenous, and Afro-Colombian communities. Projects sponsored by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have been left without funding, especially those related to the implementation of the 2016 Peace Agreement and assistance to communities affected by violence and forced displacement.

Colombia has historically been one of the main recipients of investment and development aid from the United States, establishing itself as one of its most stable allies in the region. In fiscal year 2024 alone, it received approximately $586.5 million in U.S. assistance, primarily earmarked for security programs, humanitarian aid, and support for the implementation of the Peace Agreement. For 2025, President Joe Biden’s administration had proposed a budget of over $400 million for the country. However, the Trump administration subsequently proposed an 83% cut to global international cooperation funds. Along the same lines, in July 2025, the House Appropriations Committee approved a 50% reduction in U.S. aid to Colombia for 2026—particularly for non-military programs—at the initiative of Republican Representative Mario Díaz-Balart, although the measure has yet to be ratified by the U.S. Senate.

The consequences of these cuts are already beginning to be felt in various cooperation and human rights programs. International agencies and civil society organizations have warned that the reduction in funding from the United States could impact institutional capacity to respond to humanitarian crises in Colombia, support illicit crop substitution efforts, sustain territorial development projects in rural areas, and protect social leaders in regions where armed violence persists. 

–        How do Chinese cooperation and investment models work?

 China’s model of investment and development aid is based on the principles of peaceful coexistence. This means that collaborations with recipient countries must be governed by mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality, and mutual benefit. The principle of non-interference in internal affairs contrasts with the values of major Western donors, particularly members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), whose aid is often tied to the implementation of reforms that improve democracy, human rights, and governance. The ideological differences underpinning these two models create tensions in the realm of international cooperation and have led to various criticisms of China, particularly regarding the absence of conditions related to democracy and human rights in recipient countries. 

According to AidData, Chinese development aid is structured primarily through three mechanisms: grants for social projects and technical cooperation, concessional loans with favorable terms, and commercial loans provided by Chinese state-owned banks, primarily for infrastructure and energy. This last category often sparks debate over whether it should truly be considered “development aid,” as it also serves economic and strategic objectives.

AidData groups these modalities into two broad analytical categories: ODA (Official Development Assistance), aligned with the OECD’s classic definition of development aid, and OOF (Other Official Flows), linked primarily to commercial or geopolitical interests. This distinction allows for a differentiation between projects aimed at social development and those focused on strategic investments and infrastructure.

This same data shows how, globally, Chinese cooperation is unevenly distributed across different sectors, following a hierarchical logic of priorities in which rural development does not take center stage. Resources are largely concentrated in industry, mining, and construction (404 billion USD), energy (280 billion), and transportation (199 billion). Meanwhile, for areas that could be linked to alternative rural development dynamics—such as social infrastructure (28 million) or communications (61 billion)—the flow of funds is much lower. This difference in investment amounts reveals a greater focus on large-scale projects involving Chinese companies.  

–        Agricultural development and regional dynamics in Latin America: key aspects for understanding Chinese aid in Colombia.  

 Although China’s direct investment in Colombia is currently relatively low, two factors suggest the conditions for potential future growth in its investment in Colombia: the potential of the agricultural sector and the pattern of Chinese investment in Latin America. On the one hand, the Colombian agricultural sector has established itself as one of the most dynamic sectors of the national economy; on the other hand, according to recent research on China’s international agricultural investment, its investments tend to be concentrated in countries that already maintain trade ties with Beijing and possess extensive agricultural resources. These investments are driven primarily by economic factors—such as the availability of arable land, production opportunities, and existing trade relations—rather than by exclusively geopolitical motivations. This pattern aligns with the general orientation of Chinese financial cooperation in Latin America, which focuses primarily on strategic and productive sectors. In this regard, the expansion of China’s presence in the region appears to be driven primarily by economic interests linked to access to strategic resources and the strengthening of trade relations.

This pattern suggests that, in the case of Colombia, the attraction of investment and cooperation from China would depend to a greater extent on economic factors—such as productive potential, the availability of resources, and existing trade relations—than on strictly geopolitical considerations or concerns regarding the rights of rural communities.

–        Chinese Cooperation: Does It Strengthen Autocracies and Weaken Human Rights?

 One of the most common criticisms of the Chinese financial aid model is that its lack of democratic conditions could encourage authoritarian tendencies in recipient countries.  However, the evolution of the democracy index in African countries receiving Chinese aid over a two-decade period does not show a negative relationship between the two variables. On the contrary, the results indicate a slight improvement in the democracy index in contexts where cooperation increased, although this does not imply that there is always a sufficient direct causal relationship, as other internal factors could explain these political trajectories, either concurrently or alternatively.

Similarly, an analysis of indicators related to respect for human rights—such as the ratification of international treaties and openness to United Nations monitoring mechanisms—reveals significant heterogeneity among the main recipients of Chinese aid. This raises the question of whether, in the absence of normative criteria related to democracy or human rights, the deployment of Chinese cooperation is based more on pragmatic and commercial considerations. 

–        More questions than answers.

 For now, we can tentatively conclude that, given the significant differences in their areas of interest and approaches, Chinese cooperation will not be able to replace U.S. cooperation in Colombia. The former may focus more on infrastructure, transportation, and energy projects, but it will not be able to fill the gaps that a drastic reduction in U.S. funding might leave in areas such as humanitarian aid, human rights, democracy, and even security and the fight against illicit drugs.