Beyond COP30: the dispute over a just transition in the face of corporate power

The COP30 in Belém was a forum for dispute. It was marked by the vehement presence of social movements, Indigenous peoples, and human rights organizations from the Global South, who came to Brazil with a clear slogan: to demand that climate action be rooted in social and territorial justice. But the negotiations also unfolded with overwhelming participation from companies and states reluctant to make ambitious commitments. Therefore, the scenario should not be interpreted as a social victory or as a capture of the process. Rather, COP30 left the image of a bold but uneven struggle to define the meaning of the transition and the firmness of climate obligations.

Partial victories on uneven ground

One of the most important lessons of this COP was that the achievements were the result of coordination with strategic actors and pressure from a strong social movement. The massive convergence of activists and defenders of the territory, climate and human rights organizations, and especially the peoples of the Global South, amplified a clear call for the protection of the territory, ancestral knowledge, and the safety of those who defend life in threatening contexts. And some of that spirit, evoked by the allied delegations, managed to slip into the texts of the political package approved in Belém. 

However, that same presence in the space revealed an unavoidable fracture. Indigenous delegations and leaders denounced barriers to access and limited effective influence in the blue zone spaces, where the texts are negotiated, while their agenda had to be deployed on the margins, in coordination with civil society and in public spaces of mobilization, far from political power. So there was pressure, but there were also walls.

Amid this tension, the approval of the Belém Action Mechanism for Just Transition (BAM) stands out as an important gain. The BAM is seen as a mechanism for coordinating efforts towards a just transition, strengthening international cooperation, technical assistance, capacities, and learning between countries. Politically, its commitment is no small matter, as it contributes to consolidating the idea of transition as a process of guaranteeing rights, justice, and protection of livelihoods, with a focus on workers, communities, and peoples. 

But it is also worth noting that the BAM opens a door, but does not ensure change. There is no guarantee that the climate regime will evolve, for example, towards enforceable corporate obligations. This gap between the language of justice and the actual structure of incentives is precisely the crux of the problem.

An elephant in the room: interference from the fossil fuel industry

Hence the ambivalent feeling: brief advances coexisted with profound omissions. Perhaps the clearest example is that, despite the symbolic weight of the language of rights, the documents issued failed to denounce the climate and social costs of fossil fuels and the need to abandon them. Thus, while some texts show progress, other silences reveal political imbalance and the absence of clear rules. 

According to an analysis by the civil society coalition Kick Big Polluters Out (KBPO), more than 1,600 lobbyists associated with the fossil fuel industry were accredited in Belém, equivalent to one in every 25 participants. This silence can be interpreted in light of a politically suggestive fact: the significant presence of actors linked to the energy industry. This overrepresentation suggests reasons why the final text avoided solid references to the phasing out of non-renewable energy sources, maintained a focus on voluntary solutions, and avoided strong commitments to sufficient, debt-free public financing.

In this scenario, mechanisms such as the BAM may be achieved through social pressure and broad alliances, but the final balance shows that the big polluters continue to exert considerable influence, preserving a climate regime that is driven by voluntarism, self-regulation, and green marketing of sustainability. And this tension between partial advances and blockages is not only played out at the COP: it is also disputed in the law and regulation of corporate responsibility.

The courts move forward and Europe moves backward

This struggle over the limits of corporate power is best understood in the context of international law: while courts are raising standards for climate and human rights obligations, Europe is retreating from regulation on corporate responsibility.

In addition to the political progress made in Belém, for example, Advisory Opinion 32-25 of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights confirmed that the climate crisis threatens human rights and strengthened the obligations of states to regulate, supervise, and monitor economic activities that contribute to the worsening of the crisis. Also, at the global level, the Opinions of the International Court of Justice and the Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, and General Comment 27 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, echo the understanding of the State’s reinforced obligations in the face of climate change. Taken together, these pronouncements support the view that climate action is an area of enforceable obligations. And although they are directed at states, their effects are felt by companies, as they seek to prevent large polluters from continuing to operate without limits or consequences.

Until recently, the European Union was also leading a global push for binding regulations on corporate responsibility. With its directives on corporate sustainability reporting (CSRD) and due diligence (CSDDD), as well as its Taxonomy, the EU was strengthening requirements for reporting, impact management, and corporate transparency. However, research by SOMO revealed that the so-called Competitiveness Roundtable—eleven multinationals, including oil companies ExxonMobil, Chevron, and TotalEnergies—had sought to significantly water down these standards, using the premise of a possible collapse in competitiveness. The result: on February 24, 2026, the EU Council announced the approval of the Omnibus I package as a scheme to “simplify” these three standards, excluding provisions on climate transition plans, sustainability, and climate target compliance. 

Thus, while international law raises the standard of state duties in the face of the climate emergency, corporate power, in the name of “competitiveness,” dissolves regulatory tools. But this retreat of the North also highlights the political momentum from the South.

The Santa Marta conference to move away from the fossil fuel economy

Faced with this ambivalence, between international progress and setbacks in the North, the momentum is coming from the South. COP30 in Belém showed that the clearest demand for a real abandonment of fossil fuels is coming, with force, from the Global South. 

Throughout history, these territories have been places of extraction, anchored in militarization, displacement, pollution, and the destruction of the social fabric. This legacy, challenged by the resistance of a regional and global social movement, has led to a shift in the center of gravity of the debate. Colombia, for example, presented the “Belém Declaration” at COP30 to move away from fossil fuels and, together with the Netherlands, convened the First International Conference for a Just Transition away from Fossil Fuels, to be held on April 28 and 29, 2026, in Santa Marta, Colombia. 

This event can be seen as a milestone for the Global South, attempting to steer the discussion towards roadmaps, alliances, and political cooperation for justice, human rights, and decarbonization. But it also seeks to make an important point: in the face of the ambiguity of climate multilateralism and the ability of major polluters to block the law, parallel processes are opening up in which governments and civil society pursue a more demanding agenda. 

The momentum for change comes from the South

Belém leaves us with an uncomfortable but fertile lesson: the just transition moves forward when it comes from below, driven by those on the front line of the damage, but it stumbles against persistent obstacles when the rules continue to rest on voluntarism, the market, and conflicts of interest. Moving towards a just transition requires going beyond the mere recognition of principles and the rhetorical use of rights-based language: it means transforming them into clear and binding rules that limit the power of major polluters, particularly those whose historical and current contribution to the climate crisis has been most significant. 

In this regard, articulating the social pressure expressed at COP30, the obligations and standards of international law, and political commitments such as the Santa Marta Conference allows us to uphold three key ideas. The first is that, in a context of regulatory flexibility in Europe and overwhelming corporate power, the debate on corporate responsibility must be decentralized. The second is that climate action and corporate accountability are not negotiable concessions: they are urgent legal obligations. And the last is that this urgency to call things by their name, to connect climate, justice, and accountability, is increasingly being named and pushed from below and from the South.