Catatumbo: humanitarian crisis and internal unrest

The Catatumbo region is located in Colombia, in Norte de Santander, an area bordering Venezuela. It is a territory of great biological, natural, and cultural wealth, including a tropical rainforest and the river that’s its namesake. In the Barí language, “Catatumbo” means “The House of Thunder,“ and its ancestral inhabitants are the Motilón Barí indigenous people and the peasantry, historical victims of extermination and systematic dispossession. 

At the end of 2024 and beginning of 2025, Catatumbo experienced a serious humanitarian and human rights crisis that reached alarming levels of victimization and forced displacement, triggered by increased clashes between various armed groups. In response, on January 24, President Gustavo Petro declared a 90-day state of emergency in the region and in the municipalities of the metropolitan area of Cúcuta and Río de Oro and González in the department of Cesar. 

The declaration generated considerable controversy, mainly because it was used in a territory historically marked by armed violence. The Constitutional Court was responsible for reviewing its constitutionality, and Dejusticia intervened in the process after extensive reflection on this issue. In our intervention, we debated the following questions: 

What is a state of internal unrest? 

In Colombia, there are several types of states of emergency, including one with enormous power: the state of internal unrest. The 1991 Constitution allows the government to suspend certain civil liberties in truly serious circumstances in order to deal with a crisis. However, it can only be used in three specific cases—foreign war, internal unrest, or economic, social, or ecological emergency—and requires solid justification. In other words, it is not a shortcut to unlimited governance or a tool for the president to express his or her whims, but rather an exceptional mechanism that must be necessary, relevant, and sufficiently justified. 

Why declare a state of emergency? 

In November 2024, the Ombudsman’s Office warned of an increase in violence in Catatumbo. It identified three main factors: the resumption of hostilities by the National Liberation Army (ELN) after the end of the ceasefire it had agreed with the government; the advance of the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) after clashes with the ELN; and the presence of FARC-EP dissidents, who took up arms again after abandoning the peace process signed between this guerrilla group and the government of Juan Manuel Santos. 

In a short time, the situation escalated into a humanitarian crisis unprecedented in decades. By February 8, 2025, there were 54,093 displaced persons, 32,403 in confinement, 56 homicides (including five signatories to the Peace Agreement and four minors), and eight forced disappearances of ex-combatants in the process of reintegration. 

In other words, the declaration of a state of internal unrest became the legal tool through which the government, by means of extraordinary powers, responded to the escalation of violence and massive human rights violations. 

Was the declaration of internal unrest necessary? 

Catatumbo is a territory marked by state abandonment, armed conflict, and constant disputes over territorial control. According to the National Center for Historical Memory, the conflict began in the 20th century with the arrival of US oil companies focused on the exploration and exploitation of this resource. Since then, guerrillas, paramilitaries, and drug trafficking structures have fought for power, giving rise to persistent violence that did not cease even after the signing of the Final Peace Agreement in 2016.

The severity and increase in incidents recorded in the region—mass displacement, selective killings, confinement, and forced disappearances—made it essential to activate all available mechanisms to halt the humanitarian catastrophe. The declaration of a state of internal unrest came into effect in view of the magnitude of the crisis, which required a rapid, forceful, and coordinated response from the state. In principle, without reviewing each of the measures addressed in the decree, declaring a state of internal unrest had a humanitarian objective.

However, the need to declare a state of internal unrest does not exempt Petro’s national government—or its predecessors—from responsibility for their failure to take timely action. The Ombudsman’s Office issued multiple early warnings about the risk and called for immediate intervention. Perhaps the crisis would not have reached such drastic levels if all the ordinary measures available had been activated in time. Even so, state inaction cannot be an obstacle to taking the measures required to address a crisis and restore the rights of the region’s inhabitants, even when it means opting for exceptional measures such as a state of emergency. 

In our intervention, we pointed out that the decision to declare a state of emergency cannot depend solely on the will of the government, but on the objective existence of a disturbance of public order that exceeds the ordinary institutional capacities to protect the population and restore stability. This mechanism can only be invoked with a solid and temporary justification, based on extraordinary events, as it is not designed to address structural phenomena such as armed conflict or to replace the State’s permanent obligations in terms of prevention and protection. Likewise, we note that the presence of an armed conflict does not in itself exclude the possibility of declaring a state of internal unrest, provided that it seeks to respond to a specific and time-limited situation.

In the case of Catatumbo, the magnitude of the violence and civilian suffering constituted such a serious humanitarian crisis that, although linked to historical causes of the armed conflict, it justified the declaration of a state of internal unrest as an exceptional measure to contain and protect.

Read another article from the latest edition of El Sur Global: Children defenders of human rights

What did the Constitutional Court say? 

In ruling C-148 of 2025, the Constitutional Court decided that the declaration of internal unrest was constitutional in relation to the intensification of armed clashes, attacks, and hostilities against the civilian population and signatories of the Final Peace Agreement, and the humanitarian crisis that this generated. Specifically, it considered that there had been a 567% increase in the number of victims of forced displacement in the region, the existence of more than 30,000 people confined as of February 3, 2025, and the murder of at least six peace signatories. In this regard, it declared constitutional the measures aimed at strengthening the security forces, providing humanitarian assistance, guaranteeing the fundamental rights of the civilian population, including the peace signatories, and financing these specific purposes.

However, it declared unconstitutional all other measures aimed at addressing the presence of armed groups, the concentration of illicit crops, the implementation of crop substitution plans, unmet basic needs due to insufficient social policies, and damage to energy and road infrastructure and the hydrocarbons sector. 

Ultimately, the declaration of a state of internal unrest in Catatumbo allowed the government to respond to a crisis that overwhelmed ordinary institutional capacities. However, it also highlighted the structural gaps that have condemned this region to decades of war and neglect. Exceptional responses cannot replace the state’s permanent obligations: guaranteeing rights, social investment, and building territorial peace.

Catatumbo needs not only a military presence, but also a comprehensive state presence; not only emergency decrees, but also sustained policies for a dignified life. The real work begins when the emergency is over: rebuilding the territory based on trust, justice, and recognition of its peoples. Only then will “The House of Thunder” cease to echo with violence and once again resound with life.