With judges on the chopping block, who will defend us?

“This is the story of a man / who knew very few letters / and dreamed of the justice / of comic book heroes / and disguised himself as good / in a villain’s costume / and the bad guys in the story / are the everyday heroes,” goes the song by Sui Generis, evoking the traits and effects of authoritarian powers like those that today threaten the rule of law in the region. 

According to the World Justice Project’s Global Index (2025), the rule of law is in decline in 68% of the world’s countries. One of the main reasons is that judges are losing the power to rein in governments in a context marked by multiple attacks on judicial systems. Disproportionate public accusations against judges in Colombia and structural reforms that politicize and interfere with the judicial function—as analyzed in a previous newsletter on Mexico—are among them. These attacks reflect a broader trend and underscore the need to strengthen protections of judicial independence, which enable effective judicial oversight of abuses of power and are indispensable for resisting potential assaults by authoritarian governments against the rule of law. 

In this article, we present some examples of the strategies being used to weaken the judiciary in Latin America. On the one hand, we examine the cases of El Salvador and Venezuela, countries where authoritarian governments have achieved the political capture of judges by undermining judicial independence. On the other hand, we look at the experiences of Ecuador and Brazil as examples where judges, although their independence has been threatened, have managed to resist. 

1.         “Pocket Judges” in Venezuela and El Salvador

Venezuela and El Salvador are prime examples of the capture of the judiciary and its consequences: in the face of authoritarian powers seeking to perpetuate themselves in power by violating rights, there are no independent judges to provide protection. On the contrary, judges may participate in the violation of rights, as occurred with the Venezuelan judicial system, which endorsed and facilitated state abuses by legalizing the detention of political opponents. 

The formula in Venezuela for ensuring judges lack independence was perfected, first by eliminating judicial stability through provisional appointments, and then by removing judges and replacing them with legal professionals aligned with the Chavista political faction. Meanwhile, in El Salvador, the self-proclaimed “coolest dictator in the world” not only managed to amend the Constitution to allow for his indefinite reelection as president but also removed the judges of the Constitutional Chamber and the Attorney General with the help of his majorities in the Legislative Assembly. The former were targeted for judicially blocking executive decrees during the pandemic, and the latter for investigating acts of corruption and backroom deals with gangs.

The judicial validation of Maduro’s irregular election in Venezuela and the appointment of pro-government judges who rubber-stamp everything Bukele does are evidence that the judicial branches in these countries lack independence. The results? By 2025, both countries rank among the lowest on the Rule of Law Index. Of the 32 countries evaluated in Latin America and the Caribbean, Venezuela ranks last, and El Salvador is the seventh-lowest-ranked country. 

2.   Judges Who Stood Their Ground in Ecuador and Brazil

Attacks on judicial independence do not always succeed; on some occasions, judges manage to resist political pressure, and the cases of Ecuador and Brazil are examples of these tensions. In both countries, the high courts managed to resist the narrative of polarization promoted by certain political sectors regarding judicial decisions—a textbook strategy widely used in the region to pressure the judiciary and force it to yield. 

In Ecuador, judicial independence reached a crossroads: in August 2025, the Court suspended provisions of three laws proposed by the executive branch that violated fundamental rights. In response, President Noboa and senior government officials led a march against the Court, arguing that the decision posed a threat to public safety and declaring the judges “enemies of the people.” In Quito, cries against “corrupt judges” were heard, and the city was plastered with posters of the magistrates, whom they accused of “stealing the country’s peace.” A few days later, another group of citizens took to the streets in defense of the Court, and the judges stood firm in their decision to block authoritarian measures. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights warned that these attacks jeopardize the safety of the magistrates, erode the rule of law, and undermine the role of the courts as a constitutional check on power.

In Brazil, the trial against former President Bolsonaro is one of the most significant episodes for democracy and judicial independence in recent years. In 2025, the Federal Supreme Court, the country’s highest judicial authority, ruled that the former president was guilty of attempting to delegitimize the elections and abolish the rule of law during the failed coup d’état of 2023. This trial took place in a tense political context: Bolsonaro enjoyed some social backing, influence in the legislature, and support from international actors. Despite this, and amid protests both for and against the conviction, the Court proceeded with the trial without wavering in the face of internal and external pressures. In that sense, the outcome of the case sent a clear message to both the Brazilian public and the international community: no one, not even a former president, is above the Constitution. These cases demonstrate that, even under pressure, judges can rein in governments with authoritarian tendencies, act as a counterweight, and defend the rule of law. 

Read another article from the latest issue of El Sur Global: International justice: as fragile as it is necessary

 What lessons can we draw from this?

Several governments in the region are choosing to exercise power in the style of Juan Represión in the Sui Generis song. The formula these authoritarian powers are using against judicial independence has multiple variables or ingredients, as shown by the cases of submission and resistance we saw above. The wholesale replacement of judges, polarizing populist narratives, executive attacks on the judiciary, and the politicized selection of judges are some of them.

An indispensable antidote to these authoritarian tendencies is to protect and strengthen judicial independence, which is achieved, among other things, by ensuring the irremovability and merit-based, impartial selection of judges. It is crucial that we urgently demand this remedy because, in times when our rights are under threat from expanding authoritarian powers, if we do not have a strong rule of law, a solid democracy, and independent judges, who will be able to defend us?